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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1987, an estimated three million lesbians and gay men in the
United States raised between eight and ten million children.1  In
1998, approximately six to ten million lesbian and gay parents raised
as many as fourteen million children.2  The use of assisted
reproductive technologies (“ARTs”)3 account for part of these
increasing numbers of lesbian and gay parents.4  However, while
                                                          
1. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION & THE LAW 801 (2d ed. 1997), citing
ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1512, 1513
(1987).
2. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lesbian & Gay Parenting: A Fact Sheet, at
http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/pages/documents/record?record=31 (last visited Oct. 9,
1999) (providing estimates of the number of lesbian and gay parents); see also Family Pride
Coalition, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.familypride.org/faq/index.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 1999) (listing the common percentages used to determine the number of lesbian and
gay parents).
3. Human reproduction requires four biological components and processes: (1) ova, (2)
sperm, (3) fertilization, and (4) gestation.  ARTs essentially intervene in one or more of these
four processes to facilitate reproduction.  See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS 95 (3d ed. 1997) (detailing the process of human reproduction and
highlighting the points at which fertility problems commonly occur).  ARTs include artificial
insemination-homologous (“AIH”) (artificially inseminating a woman with the sperm of a man
who intends to help parent the child, usually the woman’s husband or partner), artificial
insemination-donor (“AID”) (artificially inseminating a woman with the sperm of a man who
will presumably have no relationship with the child), in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) (removing a
woman’s ova and mixing them in a container with sperm, then returning the fertilized ova to
the woman’s uterus), gamete intrafallopian transfer (“GIFT”) (removing the ova from one
woman and injecting them along with sperm into the fallopian tubes of a second woman),
zygote intrafallopian transfer (“ZIFT”) (removing the ova from one woman and fertilizing
them, then placing the zygotes in the uterus of a second woman), embryo transfer
(inseminating one woman and then removing the embryo and placing it in the uterus of the
woman who intends to gestate and raise the child), and ova transfer (removing the ova of one
woman and inserting them in the fallopian tubes of a second woman).  See id. at 105-06
(discussing various procedures that facilitate reproduction).
This Comment addresses only those ARTs which facilitate reproduction and does not
consider genetic reproductive technologies, such as cloning.  However, note that to a certain
extent genetic reproductive technology revolves around reproduction using only female genetic
material.  See Kyle Velte, Comment, Egging on Lesbian Maternity: The Legal Implications of Tri-
Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL.’Y & L. 431, 433 n.11 (1999)
(describing several experimental and theoretical techniques for creating an embryo with
gametes from three individuals—”an egg from each of two women and the sperm from a
donor”); Steve Farrar, Science Will Give Women Ability to “Father” a Baby, LONDON TIMES, Jan. 10,
1999, available in 1999 WL 7900376 (reporting on experiments with parthenogenesis in
mammals “to overcome the genetic barrier that prevent mammals, alone in the animal
kingdom, from producing young from an unfertilized egg” and noting that parthenogenesis
allows for genetic contributions from one or two females).
4. See Deborah Bradley, A New Kind of Family: Some Gays, Lesbians Turn to Artificial
Insemination, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 16, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9048164 (noting the
growing number of same-gender couples utilizing ARTs).  In 1996, in the United States, 20,659
live births resulted from IVF, ZIFT, and GIFT.  See Centers for Disease Control, CDC’s
Reproductive Health Information Source, at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art96/sec1_q1.htm
(last visited Oct. 8, 1999) (providing an overview of the frequency and success rates of various
2
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ARTs can enable same-gender5 couples to conceive children, after the
child’s birth, lesbian and gay parents often face significant hostility
from the legal system if they attempt to have their parental rights6
legally recognized.7  In many cases, only the biological parent--e.g.,
the artificially inseminated lesbian who gave birth to the child--
receives recognition as the legal parent of the child; the partner of
the biological parent often has no legally recognized relationship
with the child.8
This Comment considers the legal implications of two ARTs which
can enable a lesbian couple9 to conceive a child who is the biological
progeny of both women.  The first, gamete intrafallopian transfer
(“GIFT”), involves removing the ova from the ovaries of one woman,
the genetic mother, and then injecting the ova, along with semen
containing fertile sperm,10 into the uterus of the second woman, the
                                                                                                                                     
ARTs).  However, this figure does not include the most common procedures—AID and AIH—
performed on “hundreds of thousands of women” annually.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at
98.
5. This Comment uses the term “gender” to refer to the dichotomies of female/male,
woman/man, girl/boy, and feminine/masculine.  Although inconsistent with the convention of
referring to physiological differences (i.e. female/male) as “sex” and cultural distinctions (i.e.
feminine/masculine, woman/man, girl/boy) as “gender,” the exclusive use of “gender”
underscores the “socially constructed, overlapping nature of all category distinctions, even the
biological ones.”  See SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 134 n.2 (1998).
6. This Comment uses the phrases “parental rights,” “parent and child relationship,” and
“mother and child relationship” interchangeably to refer to “the legal relationship existing
between a child and his [or her] natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers
or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations.”  See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A.
287-345 (1987).
7. See generally Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Protecting Families: Standards for Child
Custody in Same-Sex Relationships, at http://www.glad.org/Publications/CivilRightProject/
protectingfamilies.pdf (last visited July 20, 1999) (emphasizing the legal system’s general
hostility to same-gender family issues).
8. See, e.g., Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1991)
(determining that the biological mother “is the only parent of the two minor children that
[were] conceived by artificial insemination during her relationship with [the nonbiological
mother] . . . and that any further contact between [the nonbiological mother] and the children
shall only be by [the biological mother’s] consent”); see also discussion infra Part II (discussing
the issues raised by the failure of courts to give legal protection to families headed by lesbian
couples).
9. This Comment uses the term “lesbian couple” to refer to a female same-gender couple,
while recognizing that one or both of the women in a lesbian couple could identify as bisexual
rather than lesbian.
10. This likely would be sperm from an anonymous donor in order to avoid any paternity
issues.  See NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LESBIANS CHOOSING MOTHERHOOD: LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS OF DONOR INSEMINATION AND CO-PARENTING 1-7 (1991), reprinted in RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 1, at 883-88 (noting that “[o]ne of the primary legal concerns among lesbians using
donor insemination is whether the sperm donor will be recognized as the father of the child”
and advising that “using an unknown donor is still the safest legal protection available,
especially in states where no statutory or case law protection exists”); see also Thomas S. v. Robin
Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 378 (App. Div. 1994) (granting paternity to a known sperm donor despite
an agreement between the mother and the donor that he would not seek parental rights); Craig
W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values: The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO
3
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gestational mother.11  The second, zygote intrafallopian transfer
(“ZIFT”), involves removing the ova from the ovaries of one woman,
the genetic mother, mixing the ova with fertile sperm12 in a
container, and then implanting the fertilized ova, or zygotes, in the
uterus of the second woman, the gestational mother.13  This
Comment argues that, in such cases where a lesbian couple conceives
a child through GIFT/ZIFT, both women--the genetic mother and
the gestational mother--should be recognized as the child’s legal
parents.14
Part II of this Comment contrasts the rapid increase in the number
of lesbian and gay families with the lack of legal recognition for many
of those families in which only one parent is biologically related to
the child.15  Part III presents the arguments supporting the
recognition of both the genetic and the gestational mothers as the
legal parents of a child conceived through GIFT/ZIFT and cites
precedent from GIFT/ZIFT16 and gestational surrogacy cases,17
Supreme Court decisions concerning the fundamental liberty interest
inherent in procreation and parenting,18 and the Uniform Parentage
Act.19  Part IV recommends that the legal system afford the same
parental rights to lesbian couples as it affords mixed-gender couples;
at the very least, when both mothers have a biological tie to their
child, both should be recognized as legal parents.20  Part V concludes
that even in an ideal future where lesbian couples will have a variety
of options for creating legally recognized families, GIFT/ZIFT
                                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 1299, 1356 (1997) (observing that in the vast majority of cases where “a donor has
asserted parental claims against an unmarried woman, the donor has prevailed”).
11. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 105 (describing GIFT procedure).
12. See supra note 10 (highlighting the importance of using an anonymous sperm donor to
avoid potential paternity issues).
13. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 105 (describing ZIFT procedure).
14. See infra Part III (presenting the arguments for legal recognition of both mothers).
15. See infra Part II (outlining the relative lack of legal protection for lesbians who become
mothers through previous marriages to men, foster care, or adoption).
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing lower state court cases which recognized both mothers’
parental rights).
17. See infra Part III.B (analyzing gestational surrogacy cases, including the famous “Baby
M.” case).
18. See infra Part III.C (highlighting the cases that established fundamental parental rights,
such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923)).
19. See infra Part III.D (discussing the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception
Act and the Uniform Parentage Act).
20. See infra Part IV (concluding that until the legal system routinely recognizes the
parental rights of non-biological lesbian and gay parents, lesbian couples who conceive children
through GIFT/ZIFT can best expect legal recognition of both women’s parental status).
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procedures will remain an attractive alternative because they offer
something that adoption and others ARTs cannot provide--a child
biologically connected to both mothers.21
II. THE LACK OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR LESBIAN-HEADED FAMILIES
Lesbians can become parents in a variety of ways, either as
individuals or as a couple: some have biological children from
previous marriages to men;22 some raise foster children; and some
adopt children.23  The law, however, does not always recognize these
varied forms of motherhood.24  As a result, some lesbian couples
utilize ARTs as a way to conceive biological children, with the
understanding that biological connections are more readily
recognized by the law.25  However, due to the fact that most ARTs
cannot create a child biologically related to two women, the non-
biological mother will still have no legally recognized parental
rights.26  Only GIFT/ZIFT procedures can enable a lesbian couple to
conceive a child with two biological--and therefore two legal27--
mothers.
A. Children from Previous Marriages
In the 1970s, most lesbians became mothers while they were
married to men.28  When the lesbian mother later forms a new family
                                                          
21. See infra Part V (contemplating the importance of biological ties between parents and
children).
22. See Family Pride Coalition, supra note 2, at 1 (estimating that “25 to 42 percent of all
lesbians have been married” and that “50 to 75 percent of all lesbians who have been married
have one or more biological children.”  In contrast, “about 20 percent of gay males have been
married” and “20 to 50 percent of all gay men who have been married have one or more
biological children.”).
23. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 2, at 1 (“[T]he last decade
has seen a sharp rise among gay people planning and forming families through adoption, foster
care, donor insemination, and other reproductive technologies.”).
24. See Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 483 (1990)
(“Biology, marriage to a woman who bears a child, and legal adoption are the only bases
currently available for attaining the legal status of parent.”); see also infra Part II.B (discussing
foster care); Part II.C (discussing adoption).
25. See Velte, supra note 3, at 432 (noting that ARTs enable “lesbian couples to create
families that are based on biology and genetics, rather than the more legally precarious family
structures that are [otherwise] available”).
26. But see Peggy Lowe, Lesbian Couple Ruled Parents, DENV. POST, Oct. 26, 1999, at B20 (“A
Boulder judge has awarded full parental rights to two lesbian partners even though one of the
women has no biological ties to the other’s unborn child.”).
27. See infra Part III (presenting arguments for the legal recognition of both biological
mothers).
28. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 801 (“The law first encountered lesbian, gay, and
bisexual parents in the context of the dissolution of heterosexual marriages.”); Polikoff, supra
5
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with a female partner, the resulting family structure resembles that of
a stepfamily,29 in that the existence of a legally recognized father,
even if noncustodial, will likely keep the nonbiological “stepmother”
from having any legally recognized relationship with the child.30  In
addition, the father may challenge the custody arrangements because
of the mother’s sexual orientation.31  Further, even if the biological
father has no legally recognized parental rights32 which would bar the
stepmother’s adoption of the child, legislation in many jurisdictions
makes it difficult or impossible for lesbians to adopt.33
B. Foster Care
If a state suspects that a parent or parents have mistreated their
child, the state can remove the child from the parental home and
send the child to live with a foster family while it decides whether the
child’s best interests will be furthered by returning home.34  A child’s
stay in foster care might last only a few days or, if the state decides to
initiate termination of parental rights proceedings against the natural
parent or parents, it might last for an extended period of time.35
However, “[f]oster care does not establish a legally recognized
parent-child relationship regardless of the length of the placement.
                                                                                                                                     
note 24, at 464.  Polikoff explains that:
Mostly these are women who were unaware of their Lesbian tendencies until after they
married and had children.  Or they are women who suppressed their Lesbian feelings,
convinced, as most heterosexuals are, that these feelings represented a natural phase
in their lives and would disappear after they experienced marriage and motherhood.
There are some women, too, who consciously rejected the gay life in favor of the more
socially accepted and respected heterosexual relationships.
Id. (quoting PHYLLIS LYON & DEL MARTIN, LESBIAN/WOMAN 141 (1972)).
29. See generally SUSAN HOFFMAN, LESBIAN STEP FAMILIES: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF LOVE (1997)
(examining the experiences of five lesbian stepfamilies as part of a Social Work dissertation).
30. Some state legislatures have granted courts broad power to allow adoptions by
stepparents even when the noncustodial parent objects.  See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-219.10 -
63.1-219.11 (Michie 1999) (requiring both parents’ consent to the adoption unless there has
been a termination of parental rights.  But, this statute also provides that “[i]f after hearing
evidence the court finds that the valid consent of any person . . . whose consent is hereinabove
required is withheld contrary to the best interests of the child . . . the court may grant the
[adoption] petition without such consent.”).  However, most courts seem reluctant to exercise
such authority.  See generally Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794 (Va. 1972) (reversing a trial
court decision to grant an adoption to a stepfather over the objections of the biological father).
31. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing various courts’ treatment of
parental sexual orientation in custody disputes and citing several cases where courts considered
the homosexuality or bisexuality of a parent sufficient to bar an award of custody).
32. For example, if he voluntarily relinquished parental rights as part of a termination of
parental rights proceeding.
33. See infra Part II.C (discussing the lack of legal protection granted to lesbian couples
who have adopted and, in some jurisdictions, the inability of lesbian couples to adopt).
34. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 874 (discussing foster care generally).
35. See id.
6
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The foster parent is only a temporary guardian of the child.”36  The
child is legally a ward of the state, and the state can remove the child
from the foster home and return her to her natural parents or
transfer her to another foster home at its discretion.37
Whether lesbians can be foster parents depends upon the
jurisdiction.  For example, in some municipalities--such as New York
City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Trenton, New Jersey--social
workers try to match lesbian and gay children with lesbian and gay
foster parents, while in some states--such as North Dakota and
Massachusetts--it is difficult for lesbians to become foster parents.38
C. Adoption
Adoption creates a legal parental relationship between the
adoptive parent or parents and the child.39  Adoption terminates the
rights and responsibilities of the biological parent or parents and
transfers them to the adoptive parent or parents.40  As with foster
care, the ability of lesbians to adopt varies widely among
jurisdictions.41  Only one jurisdiction42--Florida--has a statutory ban on
lesbian and gay adoption,43 but challenges to lesbian and gay
adoption have also been raised in other states.44  Conversely, New
                                                          
36. Id.
37. See id. at 875; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977) (holding that foster parents’ due process rights were not violated by the state’s
removal of foster children that had been in their care for over a year); see also Martin v.
Pittsylvania County Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 348 S.E.2d 13, 22-23 (1986) (discussing the distinction
between regular foster care, permanent foster care, and termination of parental rights).  But cf.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4064 (West 1999) (defining “long-term foster care” as “a foster
family placement for a child in the custody of the department in which the department retains
custody of the child while delegating to the foster parents the duty and authority to make
certain decisions”); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-206.1 (Michie 1999) (recognizing “permanent foster
placement” as a status between regular foster care and adoption).
38. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 2, at 3 (discussing foster
parenting generally and noting that in North Dakota only married couples can become foster
parents).
39. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 846.
40. See id.
41. See infra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (listing extreme variation in state adoption
statutes).
42. See THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE LESBIAN & GAY LAW ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW
YORK, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES 91 (June 1999) (summarizing legislation affecting lesbian and
gay individuals and reporting that before July 2, 1999, New Hampshire also prohibited lesbian
and gay individuals and couples from becoming adoptive or foster parents).
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 1999) (“No person eligible to adopt under this
statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.”); Cox v. Florida Dep’t of Health Servs., 656
So.2d 902, 903 (Fla. 1995) (confirming the constitutionality of Florida’s ban on lesbian and gay
adoption).
44. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 865 n.3 (explaining that “courts outside of Florida are
free from statutory restraints barring adoptions by lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals but are
7
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York’s adoption laws guarantee lesbians and gay men the same
eligibility to become adoptive parents as heterosexual applicants.45
Although the majority of states that have considered this issue no
longer officially deem lesbian and gay individuals and couples unfit
to raise a child, bills barring adoptions by lesbian and gay individuals
and couples continue to be introduced in state legislatures each
year.46
While traditional adoption both terminates the parental rights of
the antecedent parents and establishes the parental rights of the
adoptive parents, second-parent adoption maintains the parental
rights of one antecedent parent while establishing the parental rights
of a (second) adoptive parent.47  For example, a non-biological
mother could second-parent adopt the biological child of her
partner, or a lesbian couple could adopt a child in stages--first one
mother adopts the child individually and then the second mother
petitions for a second-parent adoption.48  Second-parent adoption, in
the twenty-one jurisdictions which permit it,49 is one way for lesbian
couples to skirt legislative prohibitions on simultaneous joint
adoption by unmarried couples.50  According to the Lambda Legal
                                                                                                                                     
nonetheless often asked to prohibit such adoptions in practice”).
45. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 110 (McKinney 1999) (allowing unmarried adults to adopt); In
the Matter of Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397, 401 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting the state’s adoption statute
as “encouraging the adoption of as many children as possible regardless of the sexual
orientation . . . of the individuals seeking to adopt them”).
46. See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, 1998 CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES: A STATE
BY STATE REVIEW OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND HIV/AIDS-RELATED
LEGISLATION IN 1998 10 (1998) (reporting that six states introduced bills to prohibit adoption
by lesbian and gay individuals and/or couples in 1998).
47. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 866 (noting that many step-children are adopted
through second-parent adoptions in mixed-gender couples).
48. See In re M.M.D., B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. App. 1995) (allowing second-parent
adoption in stages by a gay male couple); Elizabeth Zuckerman, Comment, Second-Parent
Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families: Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
729, 731 n.8 (1986) (citing cases and situations in which courts have granted second-parent
adoptions).
49. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 2, at 4 (listing the
jurisdictions in which courts have granted second-parent adoptions: Alabama, Alaska,
California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont, and Washington).  However, Pennsylvania recently reversed its trend of
allowing second-parent adoptions.  See In re Adoption of C.C.G. & Z.C.G., No. 1192 WDA 1999,
2000 WL 1672904 (Pa. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 2000), consolidated with In re Adoption of R.B.F. &
R.C.F., No. 67 MDA 1999, 2000 WL 1673393 (Pa. Super. Nov. 8, 2000).  The Pennsylvania
superior court held that since Pennsylvania does not recognize same-sex marriages, “this Court
cannot liken same-sex partners to stepparents, thereby holding same-sex partners exempt from
the provision terminating the natural parents’ rights.”  Id. at *3.
50. But see Matter of Dana, 209 A.D.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (“The question to be
resolved . . . is whether the adoption statute of this State permits the adoption of a child by the
female life partner of the child’s natural mother.  In our view, this question must be answered
8
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Defense and Education Fund, “second-parent adoption is currently
the only way for [same-gender] couples to both become legal parents
of their children.”51
III. RECOGNIZING THE PARENTAL STATUS OF BOTH MOTHERS IN CASES
OF LESBIAN COUPLES WHO CONCEIVE A CHILD THROUGH GIFT/ZIFT
No established body of law exists regarding parental rights
associated with lesbian couples who conceive a child through
GIFT/ZIFT.  However, this section discusses four areas of law that
support the legal recognition of both mothers.  First, at least two
lower state courts have presided over lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases and
recognized both mothers’ parental status.52  Second, gestational
surrogacy cases in which a dispute arises between the gestational and
the genetic mothers reveal the factors courts should consider in
determining parental status--most notably, genetic relationship and
intent to raise the child.53 Third, U.S. Supreme Court decisions
respecting the fundamental liberty interests of procreation and
intimate association suggest confirmation of both mothers’ parental
status.54  Fourth, the Uniform Parentage Act provides statutory
support for the legal recognition of both mothers.55
                                                                                                                                     
in the negative.”), overruled by In the Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In Interest of
Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (prohibiting second-parent adoption by a lesbian
couple).
51. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, supra note 2, at 4.
52. See In the Matter of the Adoption Petition of C.C., Case N. A 19833, slip op. (Cal.
Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1997) (holding that in the case of lesbian couples, a child conceived
through GIFT/ZIFT has two legal mothers); In the Matter of Z.L.C. & B.L., Civil Action No. 97-
DR, slip op. (Col. Dist. Ct. 1997) (recognizing the legal status of both the genetic and
gestational mothers who conceived a child through GIFT/ZIFT).
53. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the preconception
intentions of the parties determine parental rights); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (holding that “the natural parents of a child shall be identified by
determination as to which individuals have provided the genetic imprint for that child”).
54. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (expanding the concepts of
constitutional protection of families to include procreation as “fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(upholding the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which encompasses the
right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
55. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287-345 (1987) (establishing the requirements for
legal recognition of the parent and child relationship).
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A. Lower Courts’ Recognition of Both the Genetic and Gestational Mothers
as the Legal Parents of a Child Conceived by a Lesbian Couple through
GIFT/ZIFT
According to one court, “[s]urrogacy technology did not exist and
a separate birth and genetic mother were factually impossible when
the statute, case law, and common law were formulated.  It must
therefore be assumed that the framers of those laws did not intend
for the law to result in two mothers.”56  Other courts, however, have
rejected this argument and found that, in the case of lesbian couples,
a child conceived through GIFT/ZIFT has two legal mothers.57
In the Matter of the Adoption Petition of C.C.,58 a California case,
involved a lesbian couple who conceived a child through ZIFT.  The
California Family Code recognized the gestational mother as the
child’s legal parent.59  To ensure that their child had two legal
parents, the genetic mother petitioned the court to adopt the child.60
However, the court refused to grant the relief requested, ruling that
it could not grant an adoption because “[t]he entire purpose of our
adoption laws is to create a parent-child relationship between two
persons who did not previously enjoy that relationship.”61  Further,
“[a] natural parent whose parental status has never been judicially
terminated, is not capable of adopting his or her own natural child.”62
The court declared that, as the genetic mother of the child, the
petitioner already possessed parentage and an adoption would
therefore be “an idle act.”63  Instead, the court issued an order for a
new birth certificate, amended to reflect the parentage of both
mothers.64
In a Colorado case involving a lesbian couple who conceived a
child through GIFT, both the genetic and the gestational mothers
petitioned to have their status as the natural mothers legally
                                                          
56. Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (acknowledging only
the genetic mother as the legal mother of a child conceived through ZIFT).
57. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
58. No. A 19833, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1997).
59. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8512 (West 1997) (“‘Birth parent’ means the biological parent or, in
the case of a person previously adopted, the adoptive parent.”).
60. See Adoption of C.C., at 1 (“This is a petition for adoption of a minor child.”).
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 4 (“On the highly exceptional, if not unique, facts of this case, the Court is
prepared to make its decree recognizing the Petitioner as the natural parent . . . and making
appropriate orders with respect to her birth certificate, on which Petitioner apparently was not
named.”).
10
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recognized.65  In this case the judge required the mothers to testify
under oath as to their intentions to jointly raise the child and
required an affidavit from the doctor who performed the
procedure.66  After considering this evidence, the judge issued a
“Decree Affirming Parental Status,” which verified that both the
gestational and the genetic mothers were the child’s natural mothers,
and ordered the state to “issue a new birth certificate for the minor
child” that listed both women as the child’s mothers.67
These lower state court cases provide persuasive precedent for the
legal recognition of both the genetic and the gestational mothers in
cases where a lesbian couple conceives a child through GIFT/ZIFT.
However, they do not carry the same authority as rulings from higher
state courts.  Several state appellate and supreme courts have
considered the competing claims of gestational and genetic mothers
in surrogacy cases, which presented similar medical procedures in a
different legal context, and indicated that in certain circumstances
courts should grant legal recognition to both mothers.68
B. Determination of Parental Status in Gestational Surrogacy Cases
Supports Legal Recognition of Both Mothers
Gestational surrogacy69 cases usually involve disputes between the
surrogate mother who gave birth to a child and the child’s genetic
mother and father.  In such surrogacy cases, the parties have often
signed a contract designating the genetic mother as the child’s legal
                                                          
65. See Kit McChesney & Barbara Lavender, Gifted Conception, CIRCLES 18 (Mar./Apr. 1998)
(describing the Colorado case of a lesbian couple who conceived a child through GIFT).
66. See id. at 20 (quoting the attorney for the mothers as recalling that the judge wanted
the mothers “to say this, under oath, in person, on the record, in the courtroom, so that no one
could come back later and challenge his ruling on the grounds that he had not verified this in
person”).
67. Id.
68. See infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text (citing one gestational surrogacy case
whose language supports recognition of two mothers in lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases).
69. “Gestational surrogacy” refers to procedures where the woman who gestates the child
did not supply the ova, which another woman (the genetic mother) provided.  Gestational
surrogacy includes GIFT/ZIFT procedures.  See FURROW ET AL., supra note 3, at 115.  Another
type of surrogacy, “traditional surrogacy,” involves the artificial insemination of a woman with
the sperm of the intended father.  Id.  In traditional surrogacy, one woman provides both the
genetic and gestational components. See id. (discussing different types of surrogacy and noting
that “[s]urrogacy may be the least technological of reproductive technologies.  It is also the
oldest; Genesis tells of Abraham’s servant Hagar bearing a child to be raised by the genetic
father, Abraham, and his wife Sarah. Genesis 16:1-16.”).  The famous “Baby M.” case involved a
traditional surrogacy arrangement.  See In the Matter of Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J.
1988) (“For a fee of $10,000, a woman agrees to be artificially inseminated with the semen of
another woman’s husband; she is to conceive a child, carry it to term, and after its birth
surrender it to the natural father and his wife.”).
11
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mother, which the surrogate mother then attempts to breach.70
Unlike lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases, gestational surrogacy cases require a
choice between two oppositional claimants.71
Courts have constructed and applied three tests for determining
which parents will receive legal recognition in surrogacy disputes: (1)
preconception intent to raise the child;72 (2) best interests of the
child;73 and (3) genetic relationship to the child.74  Rather than
comparing the relative merits and disadvantages of each test,75 this
Comment argues that under all three of these tests, a court should
grant legal recognition to both mothers in lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases.
1. Preconception Intent Test: The Parties who Intended to Raise
the Child are the Legal Parents
Johnson v. Calvert76 first raised the issue of what determined legal
motherhood at birth.  In that case, the genetic parents sued the
gestational surrogate mother after she threatened to refuse to
surrender the child and sought a declaration from the court
indicating their status as the legal parents of the child.77  While the
                                                          
70. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (involving a custody dispute
between the gestational surrogate mother and the genetic mother and father); In the Matter of
Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988) (concerning a custody dispute between the surrogate
mother (both genetic and gestational) and the father of the child along with his wife).
71. This Comment assumes that a lesbian couple who conceives a child through
GIFT/ZIFT intends to raise the child jointly.
72. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (holding that the preconception intentions of the parties
determine parental rights); see also discussion infra Part III.B.1 (reviewing the development of
preconception intention by the California supreme court and its use to support the parental
rights of lesbian couples).
73. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (arguing for a best interests of the
child test); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (rejecting
preconception intent test); see also discussion infra Part III.B.2 (arguing that a “best interests of
the child” test ultimately supports the recognition of both mothers’ rights in lesbian GIFT/ZIFT
cases).
74. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767 (holding that “the natural parents of a child shall be
identified by a determination as to which individuals have provided the genetic imprint for that
child”); see also discussion infra Part III.B.3 (reviewing two genetic contribution tests used to
determine parental rights).
75. See Malina Coleman, Gestation, Intent, and the Seed: Defining Motherhood in the Era of
Assisted Human Reproduction, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 497, 505 (1996) (analyzing intent test);
Jonathan B. Pitt, Fragmenting Procreation, 108 YALE L.J. 1893 (1999) (criticizing the intent and
genetic tests); Michelle Pierce-Gealy, Comment, “Are You My Mother?”: Ohio’s Crazy-Making Baby-
Making Produces a New Definition of Mother, 28 AKRON L. REV. 535, 550-61 (1995) (offering an
overview and critique of approaches utilized by courts to assign parental rights in gestational
surrogacy cases).
76. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
77. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778 (“After the surrogate made a demand suggesting she might
refuse to surrender the child, the couple sued for a declaration that they were the legal parents
of the unborn child, and the surrogate then filed her own action to be declared mother.  The
cases were consolidated.”).
12
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trial and appellate courts found in favor of the genetic parents based
on their equation of genetic contribution with natural and legal
parentage,78 the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
genetic parents for a different reason.  It held that the preconception
intentions of the parties determined parental status.79
The court considered the applicable provisions of the Uniform
Parentage Act,80 as codified in the California Civil Code,81 which
provided that either genetic contribution or giving birth to a child
resulted in legal paternity.82  According to the statute, both the
genetic mother and the gestational surrogate mother showed
evidence of a mother and child relationship, but the court stated that
it would only recognize one mother.83  Because no “clear legislative
preference”84 existed in the Civil Code for either the genetic mother
or the gestational surrogate mother, the court looked to the
preconception intention of the parties, as manifested in the
surrogacy contract, to determine which woman’s parental status
would receive recognition:
Mark and Crispina are a couple who desired to have a child of their
own genes but are physically unable to do so without the help of
reproductive technology.  They affirmatively intended the birth of
the child, and took the steps necessary to effect in vitro
fertilization.  But for their acted-on intentions, the child would not
exist.  Anna agreed to facilitate the procreation of Mark’s and
Crispina’s child.  The parties’ aim was to bring Mark’s and
Crispina’s child into the world, not for Mark and Crispina to
donate a zygote to Anna.  Crispina from the outset intended to be
the child’s mother.  Although the gestative function Anna
performed was necessary to bring about the child’s birth, it is safe
to say that Anna would not have been given the opportunity to
gestate or deliver the child had she, prior to implantation of the
zygote, manifested her own intent to be the child’s mother.  No
reason appears why Anna’s later change of heart should vitiate the
                                                          
78. See Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the trial
court’s decision); id. at 380-82 (affirming the trial court’s decision that the genetic parents were
the “biological and natural” parents).
79. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (noting that since evidence supported both women’s
claims, an inquiry into the parties’ intentions was necessary).
80. 9B U.L.A. 287-345 (1987); see infra Part III.D.2 (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act).
81. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7000 et seq. (West 1993).
82. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7003(1), 7004(A), 7015 (West 1993) (listing various ways of
adducing evidence of mother and child relationship).
83. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781 (finding only one natural mother “despite advances in
reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible”).
84. Id.
13
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determination that Crispina is the child’s natural mother.85
In Johnson, the court could only recognize one mother’s parental
rights because each wanted to be the sole mother of the child.86  The
court stated that “California law recognizes that a child has only one
mother,” but cited no judicial authority for the statement, and relied
only upon the facts of the case.87  The court remarked that the
genetic parents had provided the child with “a stable, intact, and
nurturing home,” while the gestational mother had little contact with
the child.88  The court also found that if the law recognized the
gestational surrogate mother’s parental rights, it would “diminish”
the genetic mother’s role.89  Under those circumstances, the court
could “see no compelling reason to recognize such a situation [of two
mothers] here.”90  By focusing on the specifics of this case, however,
the Johnson court left open the possibility that in different
circumstances, the Civil Code could authorize recognition of two
legal mothers.  Indeed, in Adoption of C.C.,91 discussed previously, the
court applied this language from Johnson in order to recognize both
the gestational and the genetic mothers as legal parents:
[T]he factual situation here is quite different than that found in
Johnson v. Calvert.  Both [the gestational and the genetic mother]
completely agree that they always intended and do now intend that
both of them would be [the child’s] parents, in law and in fact . . . .
Recognizing both as natural parents will not at all disrupt or
diminish the parental role of either; and such recognition will not
defeat or frustrate the agreement they had and do now maintain,
but will rather further the realization of the agreed-upon purposes
and objectives they each hold.92
Further, the Johnson preconception intent test93 supports the legal
recognition of both mothers in a lesbian couple.  The Johnson court
determined that when two women can predicate their claims to
maternity on a biological connection to the child, the legal mother is
the one who intended to “bring about the birth of [the] child that
                                                          
85. Id. at 782.
86. Id. at 778.
87. Id. at 781.
88. Id. at 781 n.8.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court declined “to accept the contention of amicus curiae of the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) that [it] should find that the child has two mothers.”  Id.
91. No. A 19833, slip op. (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 1997).
92. Id. at 3-4.
93. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782 (explaining the preconception intent test).
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she intended to raise as her own.”94  In the case of a lesbian couple,
both mothers would have intended to bring about the birth of their
child and raise him or her jointly.95
2. The Best Interests Test: Determination of Parental Rights Must
Serve the Best Interests of the Child
Although courts have applied the Johnson intent test in other
gestational surrogacy cases,96 some commentators have criticized it97
and at least one court has rejected it.98  The dissent in Johnson rejected
the majority’s focus on preconception intentions and suggested
instead a focus on the best interests of the child:
[T]he majority has articulated a rationale for using the concept of
intent that is grounded in principles of tort, intellectual property
and commercial contract law.  But . . . we are not deciding a case
involving the commission of a tort, the ownership of intellectual
property, or the delivery of goods under a commercial contract; we
are deciding the fate of a child . . . .  [T]his court should look . . . to
family law, as the governing paradigm and source of a rule of
decision. . . .  [The] “best interests” standard serves to assure that in
the judicial resolution of disputes affecting a child’s well-being,
protection of the minor child is the foremost consideration.
Consequently, I would apply “the best interests of the child”
standard to determine who can best assume the social and legal
responsibilities of motherhood for a child born of a gestational
surrogacy arrangement.99
Modern statutes generally apply the best interests of the child
standard in child custody adjudications.  Some states provide scant
guidance to the courts and simply refer to the best interests standard
generally,100 while other states have enumerated lists of relevant
                                                          
94. Id.
95. See supra note 70 (assuming that both women intended to raise the child jointly).
96. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (applying
the preconception intent test to recognize the gestational mother and her husband’s parental
rights instead of the genetic mother who donated her ovum to the couple and did not intend to
have any further involvement).
97. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The “Intent” of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the
Parent-Child Bond, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1261, 1295 (1994) (“Judicial reliance on intent in cases such
as Johnson will prove impractical or will be expressly transformed into a more straightforward
reliance on ordinary contract principles.”).
98. See Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 764 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (rejecting the Johnson
preconception intent test based on difficulty in application, poor public policy, and “failure to
recognize and emphasize the genetic provider’s right to consent to procreation and to
surrender potential parental rights”).
99. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
100. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (Michie 1999) (“[I]n awarding custody the court is
to be guided by the following considerations: (1) by what appears to be for the best interests of
15
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factors for courts to consider in making determinations.101  The
majority of cases considering the best interest standard have involved
mixed-gender parents;102 however, the court’s duty is not to consider
the traditional or nontraditional nature of the household, but to
further the child’s best interests.103
Courts could use the best interests of the child standard to
undermine the argument for granting legal recognition to both
mothers, believing that because of the very nature of lesbianism and
the likely adverse reaction of the community, allowing a child to grow
up in a household headed by two lesbian parents contravenes the
child’s best interests.104  However, while courts formerly considered
the homosexuality or bisexuality of a parent sufficient to bar an
award of custody,105 a majority of U.S. jurisdictions have adopted a
                                                                                                                                     
the child and if the child is of a sufficient age and intelligence to form a preference, the court
may consider that preference in determining the question.”); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-13-101
(Michie 1999) (requiring the child custody award to be “made without regard to the sex of the
parent, but solely in accordance with the welfare and best interests of the children”).
101. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1999).  The California Code states that:
In making a determination of the best interests of the child . . . the court shall, among
any other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the following:
(a.) The health, safety, and welfare of the child.
(b.)Any history of abuse by one parent or any other person seeking custody . . .
(c.) The nature and amount of contact with both parents . . .
(d.)The habitual or continual illegal use of controlled substances or . . . abuse of
alcohol by either parent.
Id.
102. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 808 (arising from divorce proceeding when one
parent is gay or bisexual).
103. See Polikoff, supra note 24, at 543 (“[T]he court’s role is neither to embrace the
creation of a nontraditional family nor to punish the parents for failing to adhere to the one-
mother/one-father form.”).
104. See Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983, 984 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (reporting the
arguments raised by the child’s mother based on the father’s bisexuality).  The mother argued
that:
she is fearful for the physical and mental well-being of the children because visitation
with their father may trigger homosexual tendencies in them; (2) during visitation
with their father they may contract AIDS; (3) homosexuality is a basis to change
custody; (4) an extended visitation would force the children to “confront the
homosexual problem” and “suffer the slings and arrows of a disapproving society;” and
(5) an adverse impact need not be shown.
Id.  The court rejected the mother’s arguments.  Id.
105. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (denying lesbian mother custody
because “there is social stigma attached to homosexuality”); S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164,
166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“[Homosexual] conduct can never be kept private enough to be a
neutral factor in the development of a child’s values and character.”); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314
N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981) (reasoning that because of societal mores against homosexuality,
serving the children’s best interests meant denying custody to their lesbian mother); Roe v.
Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985) (“[T]he father’s continuous exposure to the child of his
immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of
law . . . .  [T]he best interests of the child will only be served by protecting her from the burdens
imposed by such behavior.”).
16
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“nexus” test, which attempts to promote the best interests of the child
by considering only those factors that have an identifiable connection
with the welfare of the child.106  Under the nexus test, courts will not
consider moral beliefs, stereotypes, and social biases that do not have
a substantial connection to the best interests of the child.107
The best interests of the child standard raises different issues in the
context of a marital dissolution where one parent has a homosexual
or bisexual orientation than in the context of a lesbian couple who
conceives a child through GIFT/ZIFT.  In the former, the court must
determine whether a child’s best interests will be served by living in a
lesbian- or gay-headed household versus a heterosexual-headed
household, while in the latter, the child will live in a lesbian
household regardless of the court’s decision.108  Thus, the only best
interests issue in lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases is whether the court will
grant legal recognition to both mothers.109
While a court could not stop a lesbian couple from conceiving a
child through GIFT/ZIFT, it could refuse to legally recognize the
resulting family by characterizing such a family structure as
irredeemably contrary to the best interests of the child.110  However,
the recognition of both the genetic and the gestational mothers’
parental rights would confer numerous legal protections on the
child, thus serving the child’s best interests.  For example, the child
would likely have a right to continued contact with both mothers if
the couple separated in the future, whereas if the court did not
                                                          
106. See Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Lesbian and Gay Parenting: A Fact Sheet
(Sept. 28, 1997), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/pages/documents/record?record=31
(last visited July 15, 1999) (reporting that thirty jurisdictions have adopted a nexus test:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 810-
11 (summarizing the nexus test as “a parent’s sexuality may only be taken into account when it
has some relationship to her parenting abilities,” but noting that “the nexus test by no means
produces determinant results in favor of gay or bisexual parents . . . .  Courts have articulated a
nexus test in cases that both protect and discriminate against these parents.”).
107. See generally In re Marriage of Birdsall, 243 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct. App. 1988); D.H. v. J.H.,
418 N.E.2d 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980).
108. See Polikoff, supra note 24, at 543-44 (explaining this distinction in the context of
mixed-gender marital dissolution versus “lesbian-mother family dissolution” cases).  Polikoff
states that:
In the context of a lesbian-mother family dissolution, the child will continue to live
with a lesbian regardless of who has custody and regardless of whether the legally
unrecognized mother has visitation rights.  The only issue in these cases is whether the
court will recognize that the child has two lesbian mothers.
Id.
109. See id. at 543-44.
110. See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
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recognize both mothers’ parental status and the couple later
separated, the legally recognized mother could interrupt or sever the
child’s relationship with the nonlegal mother.111  Such interruption or
severance of the parent-child relationship would not serve the child’s
best interest.112  Also, recognizing both mothers requires both to
assume financial responsibility for their child.113  Otherwise, the non-
legal mother’s voluntary assumption of shared financial responsibility
for the child could be deemed gratuitous and, as such, she could
refuse to support the child in the future.114  Further, in case of one
mother’s death or incapacity, a second legal parent serves the child’s
best interests by keeping him or her with a known parent rather than
having to adjust to the care of a third party.115  Although the legal
                                                          
111. In the past five years, a few courts have ruled that the non-legal mother is nevertheless
a “de facto parent,” entitled to visitation after the couple separates.  See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.N.,
711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999) (ruling that a lesbian who helped raise her partner’s
biological child had been a de facto parent, entitling her to visitation rights after the couple
split up); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 549-50 (N.J. 2000) (finding that the female partner of the
biological mother had assumed a parental role in helping to raise the child and had established
a “psychological parenthood” which entitled her to petition for custody and visitation); Rubano
v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959 (R.I. 2000) (holding that the non-biological mother was “entitled to
prove that she qualified as a de facto or ‘psychological’ parent”); In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d
419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (recognizing the visitation rights of a non-biological lesbian co-parent who
had a “parent-like relationship” with the child).  But see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,
29 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that even though the parties shared child care and support duties
toward a child conceived by artificial insemination pursuant to their agreement, the non-
biological mother was not a legal or “de facto” parent).  In addition, the most recent case noted
that de facto parents could be “subject to child-support obligations.”  See Rubano, 759 A.2d at
976 (“[T]he fact that Rubano is not a biological parent does not necessarily relieve her of a
potential legal obligation to support the child.”).  However, no court has awarded a de facto
parent custody.  See Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 212 (Ct. App. 1991) (“It does not,
however, follow that as a ‘de facto’ parent appellant has the same rights as a parent to seek
custody and visitation over the objection of the children’s natural mother . . . custody can be
awarded to a de facto parent only if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
parental custody is detrimental to the children.”) (emphasis added).  See generally Barbara J.
Cox, Love Makes a Family—Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System Has Refused to Protect
Nonlegal Parents in Alternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5 (1991) (discussing the de facto parent
legal theory and cases that utilized it).
112. See E.N.O. v. L.M.N., 711 N.E.2d at 891 (“It is to be expected that children of
nontraditional families, like other children, form relationships with both parents . . . . [t]hus,
the best interest calculus must include an examination of the child’s relationship with both his
legal and de facto parent.”).
113. See generally Carole K. v. Arnold K., 380 N.Y.S.2d 593 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1976) (holding that
all parents have a legal duty to support their children even after the dissolution of the parents’
relationship); In re Aguilar, 145 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1978) (imposing criminal liability upon
parents for willful failure to support minor children).
114. See generally HOWARD CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
264 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that while stepparents can voluntarily assume the duty of support,
they can usually terminate this duty at will).
115. See In re Pearlman, No. 87-24,926 DA (Fla. Cir. Ct., Mar. 31, 1989), reprinted in part, 15
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1355 (May 30, 1989), cited in Polikoff, supra note 24, at 529-30 (awarding
custody of a deceased woman’s child to her nonbiological partner and overturning the
adoption of the child by her maternal grandparents because of the child’s attachment to the
nonbiological mother, the child’s strong preference for living with the nonbiological mother,
18
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mother could nominate the other mother as guardian of the child, a
relative of the legal mother could contest the appointment.116
Likewise, recognition of both mothers’ parental rights would enable
the child to inherit from both by intestate succession.117  Without legal
recognition, while the non-legal mother could provide for her child
through a will, one of her relatives could challenge the will and have
it subsequently invalidated; if the non-legal mother died without a
current will, the child could not be her heir at law.118
Thus, a court that applies the best interests test to determine “who
can best assume the social and legal responsibilities of motherhood
for a child born of a gestational surrogacy arrangement”119 should
conclude that recognition of both mothers’ parental rights will
promote and protect the best interest of their biological child by
securing numerous financial and emotional protections.
3. The Genetic Contribution Test: Recognizing the Genetic Parents
       as the Child’s Legal Parents
Several states focus on genetics when determining parental rights
in cases involving both a genetic and a gestational mother.120  The
states differ, however, in choosing to focus on either the genetic
mother or the genetic father as the determinative individual.121  For
example, Arkansas places the genetic father at the center of the
inquiry: he possesses parental rights, and, if he is married, so does the
woman who intends to raise the child, regardless of her biological
                                                                                                                                     
and the child’s anxiety caused by living with her grandparents).
116. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 1, at 874 n.2, citing In re Estate of Susan Hamilton, No.
24950, slip op. (Vt. P. Ct. 1989) (upholding “the designation of a biological mother’s lover as
guardian in the face of a challenge brought by the child’s grandparents”).
117. Intestate succession refers to “the method used to distribute property owned by a
person who died without a valid will—also termed ‘hereditary succession.’”  BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 335 (pocket ed. 1996).
118. The child could not be an heir, either because he or she would have no legal
relationship to the non-legal mother or because the courts would consider the child
illegitimate.  See generally Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (upholding a New York law that
precluded illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers through intestate succession
unless a court order issued during the father’s lifetime had established paternity); Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (upholding a Louisiana law that precludes an illegitimate child
from taking a father’s property through intestate succession unless the father legitimates the
child).
119. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 799 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
120. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(1-2) (Michie 1999) (using genetics to ascertain
parentage); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (holding that
“natural parents of a child shall be identified by determination as to which individuals have
provided the genetic imprint for that child”).
121. See infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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link to the child.122  However, an Ohio case, Belsito v. Clark,123 focused
on the genetic mother.124
Belsito involved the same gestational surrogacy fact pattern as
Johnson.125  However, the Belsito court rejected both the preconception
intent test utilized by the Johnson majority126 and the best interests of
the child test advocated by the dissent,127 in lieu of a test based on
genetic contribution to the child.128  The Belsito genetic contribution
test asks two questions: (1) which individuals provided the gametes
for the child; and (2) did the genetic parents waive their parental
rights and consent to allowing others to raise the child.129  Under
Belsito, “[i]f the genetic parents have not waived their rights and have
decided to raise the child, then they must be recognized as the
natural and legal parents.”130
                                                          
122. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)(1-2) (Michie 1999) (stating that in surrogacy cases
“the child shall be that of: the biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the
biological father is married”).  This statute seems like the exact opposite of the New Hampshire
statute, which focuses on the gestational mother by recognizing her parental status.  See N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:2-3 (1999).  If she is married, there is a rebuttable presumption
recognizing the parental rights of her husband.  See generally Alice Hofheimer, Note, Gestational
Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
571, at Appendix (1992) (discussing the Arkansas and New Hampshire statutes).
123. 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
124. Technically the Belsito court recognized the genetic parents’ parental status; however,
since the issue of paternity was uncontested, the court focused on assigning parental rights
between a genetic and a gestational mother.  See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 760-61.
125. Both cases involved a married couple, the genetic parents, and a surrogate gestational
mother.  However, in Belsito the surrogate gestational mother agreed with the genetic parents’
claims of parenthood.  See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 762 (explaining that the genetic parents
commenced the action because Ohio laws regarding birth certificates state: “the woman who
gave birth . . . will be listed as the child’s mother . . . [and] because the surrogate and the
genetic father are not married, the child will be considered illegitimate, and will be listed on his
birth records as ‘Baby Boy Clark’ [surrogate mother’s surname] and not as ‘Baby Boy Belsito’”).
126. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing preconception intention test).
127. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing best interests of the child test).
128. See 644 N.E.2d at 766.  According to the Belsito court:
The use of the intent test is truly a new and questionable framework upon which to
base the determination of parentage . . . .  [T]here is abundant precedent for using
the genetics test for identifying a natural parent.  For the best interests of the child
and society, there are strong arguments to recognize the genetic parent as the natural
parent . . . . Because [the genetic] test has served so well, it should remain the primary
test for determining the natural parent, or parents, in . . . surrogacy cases.
Id.
129. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767.  The Belsito court explained that:
The test to identify the natural parents should be, “Who are the genetic parents?” . . .
However, a genetic test cannot be the only basis for determining who will assume the
status of legal parent . . . . [A] second query must be made to determine the legal
parents, the individual or individuals who will raise the child.  That question must be
determined by the consent of the genetic parents.
Id.
130. Id.
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Like the preconception intent and best interests of the child tests,
the genetic contribution test supports the recognition of the parental
rights of both the genetic and gestational mothers in cases where a
lesbian couple conceived a child through GIFT/ZIFT.131  Initially, the
Belsito test would acknowledge the genetic mother’s parental status,132
since she would not have waived her parental rights.  However, since
the sperm donor would have waived his parental rights at the time of
donation,133 there would be no legally recognized second genetic
parent, and the genetic mother could presumably consent to share
the “rights and duties of parentage”134 with the gestational mother.135
Thus, courts should recognize both women’s parental rights under
the genetic contribution test.
C. U.S. Supreme Court Cases Establishing Fundamental Parental Rights
1. Fundamental Liberty Interest Inherent in Procreation and
       Parenting
Although the U.S. Constitution does not contain an explicit
confirmation of the right to procreation, a series of Supreme Court
cases have recognized fundamental rights associated with
parenting.136  Moreover, the Court has not limited the concept of
                                                          
131. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
132. Some commentators applauded the Belsito premise of genetic contribution as the
defining feature of parenthood, since this is the biological feature of parenthood that men and
women share.  See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Checkbook Maternity: When is a Mother not a Mother?, THE
NATION, Dec. 31, 1990, at 843.  Others, however, viewed this preference for genetics as based on
a male reproductive paradigm, which ignores the fact that women alone contribute another
essential element of reproduction—gestation.  See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 75, at 518
(“Women do not gain their rights to their children in this society as mothers, but as father
equivalents, as equivalent sources of seed.”) (quoting BARBARA K. ROTHMAN, RECREATING
MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 36-37 (1989)); Nicole
Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational Parenting Agreements Under California Law, 1 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 116 (1991) (stating that the genetic contribution test presents a “distorted
view of women’s wombs as ‘incubators’ for sale”).
133. See supra note 10 (explaining this Comment’s premise of anonymous sperm donation).
134. See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767.
135. The gestational mother did not assert her parental rights in Belsito, causing the court to
admit that its decision did not affect the law of parentage where the gestational surrogate does
assert her parental rights.  See Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767 n.3 (“Because that issue is not before
the court, the law of nongenetic-providing surrogacy remains, in part, uncertain.”).  However,
gestational surrogacy is distinct from lesbian GIFT/ZIFT: (1) unlike gestational surrogacy, in
lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases the genetic and gestational mothers would intend to raise the child
jointly; and (2) lesbian GIFT/ZIFT involves only two potential parents, unlike gestational
surrogacy cases, which typically involve at least three (i.e., the mixed-gender couple and the
woman who either donates her ova or gestates the couple’s child).
136. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (expanding the concepts of
constitutional protection of families to include procreation as “fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race”); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)
(upholding the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
21
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parental rights to traditional, nuclear families,137 but has held that a
person with a biological connection and a history of involvement with
a child has a constitutionally protected parental right.138  Hence, the
unorthodox nature of a lesbian couple conceiving a child through
GIFT/ZIFT does not negate the mothers’ protected interest.139
Indeed, according to Justice Brennan, the parent and child
relationship “was among the first that the Court acknowledged in its
cases defining the ‘liberty’ interest protected by the Constitution.”140
The Court also has recognized the specific rights of the gestational
mother to become pregnant141 and the genetic mother to produce
biological offspring.142  Both the genetic and gestational mothers’
fundamental rights as natural parents entitle them to the protections
of due process and equal protection.
2. Due Process: Bowers v. Hardwick143
The Court locates the right to privacy, which includes the rights of
procreation and parenting, in the liberty provision of the Due
Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.144  However, in Bowers v.
Hardwick,145 the Court refused to extend the fundamental right of
privacy to protect the right of consenting adults to engage in same-
gender sodomy.146  Some courts have since cited the existence of a
state sodomy law, combined with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
                                                                                                                                     
children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which encompasses the
right to “establish a home and bring up children”).
137. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (expanding the concept of
familial rights to include extended families).
138. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972) (“[T]he privacy interests . . . of a man in
the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection.”).
139. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 133 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting
that the fundamental liberty interests of procreation and intimate association may arise in
“unconventional . . . settings”).
140. Id. at 141-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (holding that the decision
to bear a child is fundamental to individual autonomy).
142. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.”) (emphasis in original).
143. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
144. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.”).
145. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
146. The defendant in Bowers was charged with violating Georgia’s criminal sodomy law by
engaging in oral sex with another man in his bedroom.  Id. at 186.
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Bowers, as a compelling reason to deny parental rights to lesbians and
gay men.147  However, Bowers does not, in fact, pose a formidable
challenge to the argument for legal recognition of both the genetic
and the gestational mothers of a child conceived through
GIFT/ZIFT.
First, many state appellate and supreme courts have ruled that state
sodomy laws violate the privacy rights guaranteed by the state
constitution,148 and a majority of jurisdictions currently do not have
sodomy laws.149  Second, the Court in Bowers reasoned that none of
the cases addressing familial and parental privacy rights “bear any
resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to
engage in acts of sodomy . . . .  No connection between family,
marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other has been demonstrated.”150  However, lesbian
GIFT/ZIFT cases do implicate family and procreative issues, such that
they are distinguishable factually from Bowers.  Finally, even if Bowers
precludes legal recognition of both mothers on due process grounds,
the Court in Bowers did not rule on the issue of equal protection, an
area which has expanded the constitutional protection afforded to
lesbians and gay men.151  According to the Seventh Circuit, “Bowers
will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme
Court’s holding in Romer.”152 
                                                          
147. See generally Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d 510 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987) (relying on
Bowers to reject a mother’s argument that denial of custody was a violation of her due process
rights); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995) (relying on a state sodomy statute to
deny custody to a lesbian mother).
148. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky. 1992) (finding that the
state sodomy law “violates rights of equal protection as guaranteed by our Kentucky
constitution”); New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (striking down a state sodomy
law as violative of federal and state constitutions).  But see Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508
(Mo. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of the state’s sodomy law and rejecting a challenge
based on the federal and state constitutions).
149. Thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have no sodomy laws.  Five states
(Arkansas, Kansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, and Texas) maintain same-gender sodomy laws and
thirteen states (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia) maintain mixed-
and same-gender sodomy laws.  See The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, The Right to
Privacy in the U.S. March 1999, at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomy399.gif (last visited
Oct. 21, 1999).
150. 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
151. See infra Part III.C.3 (discussing equal protection arguments).
152. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n.12 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that lesbian and
gay students have a constitutional right to equal protection from harm in public schools); see
also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority
opinion overrules the Bowers decision).
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3. Equal Protection: Romer v. Evans
Romer v. Evans153 should remind courts that states cannot rely on
homophobic prejudice as a justification for government action.  In
Romer, the Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 to Colorado’s
Constitution was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause.154  Amendment 2 stated:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual
Orientation.  Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its
branches or departments, nor any of its agencies, political
subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle
any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-
executing.155
The Court held that Amendment 2 failed even the most deferential
rational basis review.156  First, the Court found that the amendment’s
“peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group is an exceptional and . . . invalid
form of legislation.”157  Second, Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment
seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects;
it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”158
                                                          
153. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
154. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.  The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “no
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.”  U.S.
CONST. amend V.  Although this clause does not have an explicit equal protection component,
it forbids the federal government from discriminating in a manner “so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.”  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (declaring school
segregation in the District of Columbia to be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment).
The Court explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal
protection guarantee.  Id.  Equal protection analysis under the Fifth Amendment mirrors that
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995) (explaining that “‘[t]his Court’s approach to Fifth
Amendment equal protection claim has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)).  The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”  U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
155. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (citing COLO. CONST. amend. 2).
156. Id. at 631 (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class,
we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end.  Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional inquiry.”).
157. Id.
158. Id.
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The Constitution protects the parental rights of a person with a
biological connection and a history of involvement with a child159 and,
as such, when two people have a biological connection and a history
of involvement with a child the law will recognize both people as the
child’s parents.  If this constitutional protection is not extended to
lesbian couples, where both women have a biological connection to
the child, this discrepancy is subject to invalidation under Romer.160
First, such a policy of denying legal recognition to both women
would constitute an unconstitutionally broad disability on a single
group.161  The Court characterized Amendment 2 as “at once too
narrow and too broad [because i]t identifies persons by a single trait
and then denies them protection across the board.”162  Similarly,
failing to recognize parental rights of both biological mothers denies
this fundamental right only to couples who possess the single trait of
being lesbian couples--as opposed to mixed-gender couples who
utilize ARTs to conceive a child but still receive legal recognition of
their parental rights.163  Likewise, the Court viewed Amendment 2’s
disabling effect on lesbian and gay individuals’ legal status as having
“broad” and “far-reaching” implications.164  The denial of parental
rights carries a similar degree of broad and far-reaching
implications.165
Second, the refusal to legally recognize both mothers would be
invalid under Romer because it does not rationally further a legitimate
government interest and may instead be motivated only by anti-
lesbian animus.166  The states’ legitimate interest in determining
parental status should dictate a decision that serves the best interests
of the minor child, which, in cases involving lesbian couples who
conceive through GIFT/ZIFT, means granting legal recognition to
                                                          
159. See supra note 138 and accompanying text (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972)).
160. See infra notes 161-64 (explaining why not extending protection would be invalid under
Romer).
161. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (finding Amendment 2 to be
unconstitutional because it imposed a “broad . . . disability on a single named group”).
162. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
163. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a)(1999), 9B U.L.A. 33 (Supp. 2000) (determining
that the husband of a woman artificially inseminated under a physician’s supervision “is treated
in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived”).
164. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627-28.
165. See generally M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1997) (characterizing termination of
parental rights as unique in their severity of state action).
166. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35 (stating that laws enacted for broad purposes must bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose in order to outrun the injuries that
the law causes).
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both mothers.167  Further, in Romer the Court stated that laws
motivated by animosity towards “a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate government interest.”168  Relying on Romer,
many courts now presume “that constitutional claims on behalf of
lesbians and gay men have legitimacy, and that the government bears
the burden of justifying its anti-gay actions” on grounds other than
homophobia.169
D. Statutory Support for Legal Recognition of Both Mothers 
1. The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
The Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act170
(“USCACA”) defines the legal status of children conceived through
assisted conception, broadly defined to include artificial insemination
by donor (“AID”), in vitro fertilization (“IVF”), and surrogacy.171
While the USCACA’s category of assisted conception would arguably
encompass GIFT/ZIFT,172 the definitions of “donor,” “surrogate,” and
“intended parents” would preclude recognition of both mothers in
lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases.
Under the USCACA, the genetic mother would be legally
recognized as a “donor,” defined as “an individual [other than a
surrogate] who produces egg or sperm used for assisted
conception . . . but does not include a woman who gives birth to a
resulting child.”173  However, the gestational mother would not be
recognized as a “surrogate”--defined as “an adult woman who enters
into an agreement to bear a child conceived through assisted
                                                          
167. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing best interests of the child standard and its application
to children conceived through GIFT/ZIFT to lesbian couples).
168. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
169. See Ruth E. Harlow, How Far Can Romer Reach?, at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-
bin/pages/documents/record?record=15 (last visited Feb. 1, 1997) (noting that within a year
of the Romer decision attorneys have used the decision to fight a variety of anti-gay
discrimination cases).
170. 9B U.L.A. 199-214 (Supp. 2000).  Two states have adopted the USCAC: North Dakota
and Virginia.  See Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted,  UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST.
CONCEP. ACT, 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE §14-18-01 to –07; VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-156 to -165).
171. See Comment, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 1, 9B U.L.A. 202 (Supp. 2000)
(explaining the scope of the USCACA).
172. See UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 1(1), 9B U.L.A. 202 (Supp. 2000) (“‘Assisted
conception’ means a pregnancy resulting from (i) fertilizing an egg of a woman with sperm of a
man by means other than sexual intercourse or (ii) implanting an embryo . . . .”).
173. UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 1(2), 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000).
26
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 19
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol9/iss1/19
LILITH.FINALMACRO 3/7/01  9:14 PM
2001]  THE G.I.F.T. OF TWO BIOLOGICAL AND LEGAL MOTHERS 233
conception for the intended parents”174--and the lesbian couple would
not be recognized as “intended parents”--defined as “a man and a
woman, married to each other, who enter into an agreement under
this [Act] providing that they will be the parents of a child born to a
surrogate . . . .”175  As a result, the USCACA would classify lesbian
GIFT/ZIFT as assisted conception, but would not utilize a surrogacy
analysis to determine parental rights.176
The USCACA clearly delineates parental rights associated with
assisted conception without surrogacy: “a woman who gives birth to a
child is the child’s mother”177 and “a donor is not a parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception.”178  Thus, under the
USCACA, only the gestational mother would receive legal
recognition of her parental rights.  This result, however, contradicts
the motivation behind the USCACA “to provide a child with two
parents.”179  Moreover, North Dakota, one of the two jurisdiction
adopting the USCACA, omits several sections,180 one of particular
relevance to lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases: North Dakota does not
include the section that deems the gestational mother the child’s
legal mother,181 but does include the section that denies parental
recognition to the genetic mother.182  As a result, the USCACA as
adopted in North Dakota would recognize neither the genetic nor
                                                          
174. UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 1(4), 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000).
175. UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 1(3), 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000). See Ann
MacLean Massie, Restricting Surrogacy to Married Couples: A Constitutional Problem? The Married-
Parent Requirement in the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, 18 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 487, 528-29 (1991) (arguing that defining intended parents to exclude non-married
couples is constitutional).
176. The majority of the USCACA deals with surrogacy.  See UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST.
CONCEP. ALTERNATIVE A §§ 5-9, ALTERNATIVE B § 5, 9B U.L.A. 205-13 (Supp. 2000).  The
USCACA sets forth two alternate provisions, Alternatives A and B.  Alternative A comprises
sections 5 though 9 of the USCACA and Alternative B section 5 proclaims all surrogacy
agreements to be null and void.  Id.
177. UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 2, 9B U.L.A. 203 (Supp. 2000).  See UNIF. STATUS
CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 3, 9B U.L.A. 203-04 (Supp. 2000) (“The husband of a woman who bears
a child through assisted conception is the father of the child.”).
178. UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 204 (Supp. 2000).
179. See Prefatory Note, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP., 9B U.L.A. 199 (Supp. 2000)
(reporting that “there was great urgency on the part of the Drafting Committee to provide a
child with two parents, and this established a presumption of paternity in the husband of a
married woman who bears a child through assisted conception”).
180. North Dakota adopted Alternative B, which in effect prohibits all surrogacy
agreements. See Comment, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP., 9B U.L.A. 212 (Supp. 2000)
(“Alternative B adopted in: North Dakota.”).
181. See Action in Adopting Jurisdiction, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 2, 9B U.L.A.
203 (Supp. 2000) (“North Dakota omits this section.”).
182. See Variations from Official Text, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP. § 4, 9B U.L.A.
205 (Supp. 2000) (noting that North Dakota retains subsection (a), which reads “a donor is not
the parent of a child conceived through assisted conception”).
27
Lilith: The G.I.F.T. of Two Biological and Legal Mothers
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2001
LILITH.FINALMACRO 3/7/01  9:14 PM
234 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW [Vol. 9:1
the gestational mother.  This result completely subverts the intention
behind the USCACA of protecting the best interests of the child.183
In fact, the Prefatory Notes to the USCACA contemplate the
scenario in which a child of assisted conception might have “no one
[legally] responsible for support, nurturing, health, well being” and
proclaim that “the greatest priority . . . of the Drafting Committee was
to provide an act which addressed these . . . deficiencies.”184  In lieu of
reaching this presumably unforeseen and unfortunate result, the
courts would be wise to rely upon the UPA instead of the USCACA.185
2. The Uniform Parentage Act
The Uniform Parentage Act186 (“UPA”) establishes the
requirements for legal recognition of the parent and child
relationship.187  While only two states have adopted the USCACA,188
eighteen states have adopted the UPA;189 thus, lesbian parents are
                                                          
183. See Prefatory Note, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP., 9B U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 2000).
The Prefatory Note states that:
It is extremely important for all to understand clearly the mandate which has guided
the Drafting Committee in the preparation of this Act.  The Committee was given the
responsibility to draft . . . a child oriented act . . . that would inure to the benefit of
those children born as a result of [assisted conception]. . . . This Act was designed
primarily to effect the security and well being of those children born and living . . . as a
result of assisted conception.
Id.
184. Prefatory Note, UNIF. STATUS CHILD. ASST. CONCEP., 9B U.L.A. 200 (Supp. 2000).
185. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-01 to -26 (1999) (adopting the UPA).  But see infra note
189 (listing the eighteen states which have adopted the UPA and recognizing that Virginia is
not among them).
186. 9B U.L.A. 287-345 (1987).
187. The Uniform Parentage Act was intended to address issues of legitimacy and not
surrogacy.  See Notes, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 287-90 (1987); see also In re Marriage of
Moschetta, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1218 (1994) (concluding that the UPA does not have any
reasonable application to surrogacy cases).  However, a lesbian couple who conceived a child
through GIFT/ZIFT would not implicate surrogacy issues and, therefore, this limitation does
not prevent the application of the UPA to lesbian GIFT/ZIFT cases.  Cf. Nancy S. v. Michelle G.,
228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991) (holding that non-biological mother who had not adopted the
biological children of her female partner was not a parent within the meaning of the UPA).
188. See supra note 170 (listing the states that adopted the USCACA).
189. These eighteen states are: Alabama, California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming.  See Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted,
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 17 (1987)  (citing ALA. CODE § 26-17-1 to 26-17-2; CAL. FAM.
CODE ANN. §§ 7600 to 7730; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-101 to 19-4-130; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, §§ 801 to 819; HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-1 to 584-26; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/1 to 45/26; KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-1110 to 38-1138; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.51 to 257.75; MO. ANN. STAT. §
210.817 to 210.852; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-101 to 40-6-135; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.011 to
126.371; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-38 to 9:17-59; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-1 to 40-11-23; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-17-01 to 14-17-26; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 to 3111.19; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-
1 to 15-8-27; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.010 to 26.26.905; and WYO. STAT. § 14-2-101 to 14-2-
120).
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more likely to seek recognition under the UPA than the USCACA.
Section 3(1) of the UPA provides that “[t]he parent and child
relationship” may be established between a child and the natural
mother “by proof of her having given birth to the child.”190  The UPA
thus presumptively designates the gestational mother as the child’s
legal mother, but requires additional proof to establish that the
genetic mother also has a legally recognized parental relationship.191
While section 3 does not specify any other acceptable means of
proving maternity,192 the comment to section 21 explains that because
of the relatively low number of maternity disputes the UPA’s drafters
focused primarily on guidelines for establishing paternity,193 and
section 21 states that any relevant portions of the UPA can be applied
to establish maternity.194  States that have adopted the UPA have
made this dual applicability even more explicit.  For example, the
Colorado statute modeled on the UPA states: “[i]n case of a
maternity suit against a purported mother, where appropriate in the
context, the word ‘father’ shall mean ‘mother.’”195
Section 4(a) of the UPA states the conditions under which the law
presumes a man to be the natural father of a child.196  First,
subsection (4) provides that the presumption of parentage exists if,
“while the child is under the age of majority, [a man] receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural
child.”197  Substituting the feminine for the masculine pronouns
                                                          
190. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3 (1), 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987).
191. The UPA favors the gestational mother as the legal mother, in contrast to the genetic
contribution test, which favors the genetic mother as the legal mother.  See supra Part III.B.3
(discussing the genetic contribution test).  A jurisdiction such as Ohio, which has adopted the
UPA, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 to 3111.19, and uses the genetic contribution test, see
Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994), provides possibly the strongest case
law and statutory support for the legal recognition of both mothers.
192. Section 3, in its entirety, states only that:
The parent and child relationship between a child and (1) the natural mother may be
established by proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this Act; (2) the
natural father may be established under this Act; (3) an adoptive parent may be
established by proof of adoption or under the [Revised Uniform Adoption Act].
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 3, 9B U.L.A. 297-98 (1987).
193. The comment to § 21 explains: “[s]ince it is not believed that cases of this nature will
arise frequently, Sections 4 to 20 are written principally in terms of the ascertainment of
paternity.”  Comment, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21, 9B U.L.A. 334 (1987).
194. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21, 9B U.L.A. 334 (1987) (indicating that “[a]ny interested
party may bring an action to determine the existence or nonexistence of a mother and child
relationship.  Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this Act applicable to the father and child
relationship apply”).
195. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-125 (West 1999).
196. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4, 9B U.L.A. 298-99 (1987).
197. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987).
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creates the presumption of maternity for a woman who receives a
minor child into her home and openly holds the child out as her
natural child.198  In the case of a lesbian couple, the genetic mother
presumably will have resided with the child since birth and openly
acknowledged the child as her own.199  Consequently, the genetic
mother should be recognized as a presumed parent pursuant to
subsection (4).  Second, subsection (5) creates the presumption of
paternity if a man files a written acknowledgment of his paternity,
along with a written statement by the mother that she does not
dispute his claim of paternity, with the court or registrar of vital
statistics.200  In the case of lesbian couples, the genetic mother could
file a petition to establish maternity at the same time that the
gestational mother files the notice of the birth, and, as part of such a
joint filing, the gestational mother could assent to the genetic
mother’s status as parent.201  Third, while subsection (1) presumes the
paternity of the man married to the child’s natural mother,202 legal
recognition of the relationship between the child and the genetic
mother does not depend on the existence of a marriage between the
two natural parents.203
In addition, section 12 of the UPA allows for the presumption of
parentage from  “blood test results . . . of the statistical probability of
the alleged father’s paternity”204 or “medical or anthropological
evidence relating to the alleged father’s paternity of the child based
                                                          
198. A literal substitution of the feminine for the masculine pronouns in § 4(a)(4) would
read: “A [woman] is presumed to be the natural [mother] of a child if: while the child is under
the age of minority, [she] receive the child into [her] home and openly holds out the child as
[her] natural child.”
199. See supra note 71 (stating this Comment’s assumption that a lesbian couple who
conceived a child through GIFT/ZIFT would intend to raise the child together).
200. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987).  This section states that:
A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if: he acknowledges his paternity
of the child in a writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau],
which shall promptly inform the mother of the filing of the acknowledgment, and she
does not dispute the acknowledgment within a reasonable time after being informed
thereof, in a writing filed with the [appropriate court or Vital Statistics Bureau].
Id.
201. See McChesney & Lavender, supra note 65, at 19 (explaining that in the Colorado
lesbian GIFT case, the mothers filed a “Petition for Determination of Parent and Child
Relationship” which contained a stipulation that both parties agreed to their own and each
other’s maternity).
202. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
203. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2, 9B U.L.A. 296 (1987) (“The parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital status
of the parents.”).
204. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12(3), 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987).
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on tests performed by experts.”205  Substituting the feminine for the
masculine pronouns creates the presumption of maternity, as such
genetic tests would confirm the genetic mother’s biological
relationship to the child.
Finally, section 4(5)(b)  provides that:
A presumption under this section may be rebutted in an
appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.  If two or
more presumptions arise which conflict with each other, the
presumption which on the facts is founded on the weightier
considerations of policy and logic controls. The presumption is
rebutted by a court decree establishing paternity of the child by
another man.206
While section 21 of the UPA directs substitution of the feminine for
the masculine “insofar as practicable,”207 in the context of this means
of rebutting the presumption of paternity, “mother” should not be
substituted for “father.”  While proof of the paternity of another man
would negate the paternity of an alleged father, proof of the genetic
mother’s maternity does not negate the gestational mother’s
maternity, because whereas only one man can provide the necessary
biological material to inseminate an egg, two different components of
maternity exist--genetic and gestational.208  By permitting two different
mothers to serve those two functions, GIFT/ZIFT changes the
traditional notion that a child can have only one mother:
The capability of separating the process of producing eggs from
the act of gestation renders obsolete the use of the word biological
to modify the word mother.  [Newly developed artificial means of
reproduction] now make it possible for two different women to
make a biological contribution to the creation of a new life. It
would be a prescriptive rather than a descriptive definition to
maintain that the egg donor should properly be called the
biological mother.  The woman who contributes her womb during
gestation . . . is also a biological mother.209
Since the UPA contains no language that imposes a limit of only one
possible mother and child relationship, its recognition of only one
father should not extend to recognize only one mother.210
                                                          
205. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 12(4), 9B U.L.A. 317 (1987).
206. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(5)(b), 9B U.L.A. 299 (1987).
207. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 21, 9B U.L.A. 334 (1987).
208. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text (differentiating between genetic and
gestational maternity and explaining the GIFT/ZIFT procedure).
209. Ruth Macklin, Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our Understanding of the Family,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb., p. 6 (1991).
210. See Jerald V. Hale, Note, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers, Mothers, and Children in the
Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335, 345-46 (1998) (noting that while the UPA resolves all
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The legislative intent behind the UPA also supports the legal
recognition of both mothers.211  The UPA codified the rulings of
several Supreme Court decisions that mandated equal treatment of
legitimate and illegitimate children212 and allowed for the recognition
of two legal parents for a child, both of whom owe the child certain
rights, including support and inheritance.213  The drafters of the UPA,
as well as the various state legislatures that adopted the UPA probably
did not anticipate cases of children conceived by lesbian couples
through GIFT/ZIFT, both because society did not commonly
recognize such alternative families and because medical science had
not yet developed GIFT/ZIFT procedures.214  However, the legislative
intent of the UPA still applies to such cases, as statutes are not frozen
in time but must necessarily be applied to situations and
circumstances not within the drafters’ original contemplation.215  In
fact, legislative enactments by their very nature must generalize and
impose principles applicable to a variety of unenumerated and
unforeseen situations.216  Statutory construction requires recognition
of modern realities, including diverse family structures such as same-
gender parents and surrogate mothers, particularly when such
                                                                                                                                     
paternity disputes by recognition of only one father, “more than one mother can be legally
recognized under the UPA”).
211. See infra notes 212-19 and accompanying text (outlining the legislative intent behind
the UPA).
212. See generally Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (deciding that illegitimate children
are guaranteed a right of support from their fathers); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972) (holding that worker’s compensation benefits related to the death of their father
are due dependent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children).  The UPA states that “[t]he parent
and child relationship extends equally to every child and every parent, regardless of the marital
status of the parents.”  UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 2 (1999), 9B U.L.A. 24 (Supp. 2000).  See also
Frederic B. Rodgers, Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: Uniform Parentage Act of 1977, 6
COLO. LAW. 1298, 1298 (1977) (noting that under the UPA issues of legitimacy are irrelevant to
the establishment of a parent and child relationship).
213. See Hobus v. Hobus, 540 N.W.2d 158, 160 (N.D. 1995) (explaining that under the UPA
the parent of a child is obligated to care for, protect, support, educate, give moral guidance to,
and provide a home for the child).
214. See supra Parts I-II (recounting the historical background of GIFT/ZIFT and the
evolution of the legal treatment same-gender parents).
215. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 577 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring) (explaining that the drafters’ intent behind a statute is only one “in the
hierarchy of issues to be explored” in applying the statute).  But see Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989) (arguing against evolving interpretations of
the law and averring that “the main danger in . . . judicial interpretation of any law is that the
judges will mistake their own predilections for law. . . .  One might reduce this danger by
insisting that the new values invoked to replace original meanings be clearly and objectively
manifested in the laws.”).
216. See Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 54, 161 (1990) (statement of
Judge David Souter) (emphasizing that the application of constitutional and statutory
provisions is “enlightened by changing facts and circumstances in society”).
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recognition is in the child’s best interest:
The reality of a child’s life does not depend upon legal rules. In
assessing the rights of parents who do not fit the one-mother/one-
father status, courts can either preserve the fiction of this status
regardless of the child’s reality, or they can recognize diversity and
tailor rules accordingly.  They cannot, however, make the family
life of all children uniform.217
The intention behind passage of the UPA fits the situation of
lesbian couples who conceive a child through GIFT/ZIFT.218  The fact
that the enactors of the UPA did not anticipate the medical or
familial circumstances of children conceived through GIFT/ZIFT
and born to lesbian couples should not interfere with application of
the statute’s protections to a situation that comes within its express
terms and underlying purposes.219  The courts should recognize both
mothers of a child conceived through GIFT/ZIFT and grant such a
child the same benefits afforded any other child who seeks legitimacy
through the UPA.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
GIFT/ZIFT offers lesbian couples the opportunity to conceive a
child who has a distinct biological connection to both women.  Since
in this respect a lesbian couple is similarly situated to a mixed-gender
couple, who possess a fundamental liberty interest associated with
procreation and parenting, the lesbian couple’s parental rights
should receive equal protection under the law.220  Also, in states which
have adopted the UPA, its express language should apply--because
the UPA does not proscribe the existence of two mothers and no
courts have interpreted it as doing so under similar circumstances--
leading to the recognition of both the gestational and the genetic
mothers’ parental status.221
Until the legal system routinely recognizes the parental rights of
non-biological lesbian parents, lesbian couples who conceive children
                                                          
217. See Polikoff, supra note 24, at 473 (noting that the law proscribes rather than describes
the reality of modern families).
218. See generally supra Part III.D.2 (explaining how the UPA recognizes both the gestational
and genetic mothers of a child conceived through GIFT/ZIFT).
219. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 1, 9B U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 2000) (conveying the UPA’s
purpose as recognizing “the legal relationship existing between a child and his[or her] natural
[biological] parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and
obligations”).
220. See supra Part III.C.3 (asserting the reasons why lesbian couples should receive equal
protection).
221. See supra Part III.D.2 (illustrating the positive effects the UPA may have on lesbian
couples seeking parental status).
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through GIFT/ZIFT can best expect legal recognition of both
women’s parental status.  Individuals,222 organizations,223
publications,224 and websites225 which aid lesbian couples in becoming
parents should be made aware of the possibilities of GIFT/ZIFT so
that they can pass this information along to lesbian couples,
especially those who live in jurisdictions that limit or preclude them
from other means of becoming mothers.226  Although the number of
lesbian couples who utilize GIFT/ZIFT procedures is at present
probably rather small, this low incidence may be due, at least in part,
to a general lack of awareness.  If GIFT/ZIFT, specifically lesbian
GIFT/ZIFT, continues to receive wider publicity and popular culture
exposure,227 the number of lesbians seeking these procedures will
likely increase.
V. CONCLUSION: THE GIFT OF TWO BIOLOGICAL MOTHERS
While many feminist, lesbian, and gay legal scholars argue for a
broader notion of family,228 with legal recognition of multiple parents
                                                          
222. See, e.g., Surrogacy Attorney, at http://www.surrogacyattorney.com (last visited Sept. 10,
2000) (advertising the services of a “surrogacy attorney” who works with “non-traditional
families, including single parents and members of the gay and lesbian community”).
223. See, e.g., Growing Generations, at http://www.growinggenerations.com (last visited Sept.
10, 2000) (“Growing Generations, LLC is the first and only gay and lesbian owned surrogacy
firm exclusively serving the gay community worldwide.”); Surrogate Mothers, Inc., at http://www.
surrogatemothers.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2000) (“SMI . . . is the only recognized surrogacy
program in the world which also openly works with gay and lesbian couples/individuals.”);
California Surrogacy Specialist International, at http://www.calisurrogacy.qpg.com (last visited Jan.
18, 2000) (characterizing itself as “serving the gay community in creating families for our
future”).
224. See, e.g., Gay Parent Magazine, at http://www.gayparentmag.com (last modified Sept. 8,
2000) (offering “resource[s] for lesbians and gay men who are, or wish to be parents”);
Alternative Family Magazine, at http://www.altfammag.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2000)
(marketing itself as “America’s premier magazine for GLBT parents and their children”).
225. See, e.g., Family Q: The Internet Resource for Lesbian Moms and Gay Dads, at
http://www.studio8prod.com/familyq (last visited Jan. 18, 2000) (“The purpose of this web site
is to provide lesbians and gay men with access to information regarding building and
maintaining a family despite the lack of social support for lesbian and gay parents, as well as a
means for contacting others in the same or similar situation.”).
226. See supra Part II.
227. For example, a recent episode of the popular television show, Judging Amy, involved a
lesbian GIFT/ZIFT case.  In that fictional case, the genetic mother sued the hospital because of
its failure to include her name, along with the child’s gestational mother’s name, on the birth
certificate.  The hospital argued that to include both mothers’ names would be tantamount to
recognizing same-gender marriage.  The fictional Judge Gray rejected the hospital’s argument
and, focusing on the biological connection both women had to the child and their
preconception intention to raise the child together, found that the best interests of the child
standard mandated the recognition of both mothers and ordered the hospital to amend the
child’s birth certificate.  See Judging Amy: The Treachery of Compromise (CBS television broadcast,
Feb. 27, 2001).
228. See, e.g., Polikoff, supra note 24, at 490-91 (“Courts or legislatures looking for guidance
in developing a new definition of parenthood would best serve the interests of children by
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and caregivers,229 others contend that feminists should not slight the
strength of biological familial connections.  According to one such
feminist:
The biological links in a family create powerful bonds because they
are particular, specific, unique, and most important, irreversible
connections.  While one can divorce a spouse, the genetic tie
between parent and child or between siblings can never be
undone. . . .  Morally obligating ties of blood kinship produce
responsibilities that no one contracts for or enters into with
informed consent.230
Thus, even as lesbian couples’ options for creating legally recognized
families continue to increase,231 GIFT/ZIFT procedures remain an
attractive option because they offer something that adoption and
others ARTs cannot provide--a child biologically connected to both
mothers.
Nevertheless, some feminist anthropologists have expressed
considerable concern about the effect on kinship relations of same-
gender couples utilizing ARTs.232  Kinship traditionally involves a
convergence of genetic ties with the gestational and nurturing roles;
by splitting these aspects, some feminists fear that ARTs threaten the
essence of kinship.233  But, many of these concerns specifically focus
                                                                                                                                     
focusing on two criteria: the legally unrelated adult’s performance of parenting functions and
the child’s view of that adult as a parent.”).
229. See, e.g., Allison Harvey Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of the
Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 515 (1998) (“A more inclusive notion of family
does not mean simply adding to the number of ‘parents’ which law and society recognize.  The
challenge is to approach the task with a greater degree of imagination, so that different types
and degrees of contribution and potential contribution may be fostered.”).
230. Sidney Callahan, Gays, Lesbians, and the Use of Alternate Reproductive Technologies, in
FEMINISM AND FAMILIES 188, 191 (Hilde Lindermann Nelson ed., 1997).
231. For example, Vermont’s recently enacted Act Relating to Civil Unions “provide[s]
eligible same-sex couples the opportunity to ‘obtain the same benefits and protections afforded
by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples’ as required by Chapter I, Article 7th of the
Vermont Constitution.”  H.847, No. 91 An Act Relating to Civil Unions, § 2(a) (Vt. 2000)
(enacted), available at Acts of the 1999-2000 Vermont Legislature,
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/acts/act.091.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2000).  Lesbian
couples with a certified civil union receive equal treatment in terms of establishing parental
relationships; they are to be treated the same as married couples under Vermont’s adoption
laws and “the rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes
the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married
couple.”  H. 847, § 1204(e)(4) - (f) (Vt. 2000).  In other words, for a lesbian couple with a
certified civil union, both the biological and non-biological mothers would be considered legal
parents at the child’s birth, and, if the couple were to separate, issues of custody, visitation, and
support would be governed by Vermont’s divorce laws.  See H. 847, § 1204(d) (Vt. 2000).
232. See Callahan, supra note 230, at 198 (“Intentionally using medical technology to break
apart genetic, gestational, and social parenting by the use of [ARTs] breaks down the moral
responsibility and personal integrity embodied individuals should exercise in their use of
reproductive powers.”).
233. See, e.g., HELENA RAGONÉ, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 109-
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on surrogacy, which severs the gestational (or gestational and
genetic) role from the nurturing role.234  These concerns do not apply
to lesbian couples who utilize GIFT/ZIFT, for although the genetic
and gestational roles are split between two women, these roles
converge with the nurturing role as both women raise the child
jointly.235
In short, GIFT/ZIFT offers lesbian couples the opportunity to
conceive a child who has a distinct biological connection to both
women—an experience which until recently could only be shared by
a fertile mixed-gender couple.  As a result, GIFT/ZIFT allows for a
new type of lesbian family: one whose kinship is supported by both
biology and the law.
                                                                                                                                     
12 (1994) (stating that the introduction of ARTs, especially surrogate parenting, raises many
new questions about kinship).
234. See id. (discussing the separation of biological motherhood from social motherhood).
But cf. Callahan, supra note 230, at 198 (arguing that sperm donation harms kinship ties).
235. Concerns about the effect of sperm donation on kinship are implicated by lesbian
couples who utilize GIFT/ZIFT.  However, the harm to kinship because of sperm donation
results from the removal of men’s responsibility for the children conceived via their sperm; the
child is harmed by sperm donation because the child only has one parent.  See Callahan, supra
note 230, at 198 (arguing that sperm donors disrupt kinship to the same degree as surrogacy).
Children of lesbian couples, conceived with donor sperm as part of GIFT/ZIFT, will have two
parents and will experience the degree of “familial bonding necessary for multigenerational
families to flourish.”  Id.
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